I

Introduction
There is a certain repeated constant feature in the form of territorial organization observed at the global level. For the United Nations, the world is divided into regions (indeed, its five regional economic com missions -the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ( e c la c ) among themreflect a first broad division of the globe into re gions). Each of these regions is made up, in turn, of a number of countries which form subregions, and if we zoom in closer on these, we discover that each country is divided in turn into regions or more ancient political and administrative divisions. This has led to considerable confusion over the use of the term "region", which etymologically simply denotes a territory with royal or kingly attributes: i.e., a terri tory involving the idea of political power. From that perspective, the concept of region is more appropri ate to a subnational rather than a farther-reaching geographic scale. There are areas of the world (certain European countries, for example) where historical regional characteristics preceded and gave rise to a regional institutional framework (as in the case of the long standing regional "communities" in Spain and their role in giving rise to the Autonomous Constitution). In those places, the new regions -which merely reflect the formalization, modernization and institu tionalization of collective perceptions of identity with and belonging to certain territories and social practices-find it a relatively simple matter to secure their political, social and economic consolidation: in a sense, those regions are "bom subjects". For this and other reasons, such regions are highly functional to the current process of globalization. Modernity has not completely deprived society of a feeling of be longing to the territory it inhabits, and there has not been consummation of the shift from a form of regu lation based on a horizontal logic (that of territories) to a vertical one (that of sectors), as Muller (1990) would say. The paradox lies in the fact that today we are witnessing a return to territoriality, so that □ The author wishes to express his thanks for the valuable suggestions made by Gladys Zurita. societies with "incomplete modernity" would seem to be better equipped -from that point of view-for in ternational competition. Naturally, there is no ques tion of going back to ancient, autarchic forms of territoriality, but seeking instead a highly interactive form of territoriality, as part of networks.
In other parts of the world, specifically Latin America, the opposite has been true, since generally speaking the institutional framework has preceded and generated regional characteristics. This means that deliberate political actions were taken to create (establish) regions without there being any pre existing historical, sociological, anthropological or other kinds of elements to support such actions, which were based more on instrumental rationality than on the recognition of belonging to or identifying with a region. In such cases, it can be said that those regions were bom as objects and have yet to become subjects.
In the vast majority of cases, these regional con structs arose from the joining-together of various units which already existed in the country's scheme of political and administrative division, bringing a variety of criteria into play in doing so (Stohr, 1969; Boisier, 1976) . This has been happening in Latin America for at least half a century, if one counts from the time of the first regions identified as river basins, under the influence of the institutional model of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
It was only from the mid-1960s, however, that regionalization, as an authentic "national project", became established (but not necessarily successfully) as a continuous practice. The rationale behind this was associated with the theory of social modern ization so much in vogue during those years. As Germani (1964) points out, the theory of social mod ernization -as a theory of the transition from under development to development-placed special emphasis on the idea that the lack of internal integration of the countries was an obstacle hindering our part of the world from taking the same road to progress as the industrialized economies. The shortcomings in inter nal integration were reflected in the lack of transport and communications infrastructure, the absence of national markets (and the prevalence of segmented regional markets), and the lack of a single political and institutional framework, accepted throughout the territory. This analysis led to the obvious recommen dation that what was needed was physical, economic and socio-political integration. In order to facilitate this task, it was considered that the old form of politi cal and administrative division (which reflected the territorial organization of the colonial past) should be replaced by a new form of territorial division: re gions. Such regions would cover the whole national territory, forming a true regional system.1
An assessment made in the early 1990s of re gionalization efforts was rather disappointing. If the criterion for evaluation was whether regions had been given constitutional status or not, then the only successes were Chile (through its 1980 Constitution, the constitutional changes introduced in 1991, and especially the 1993 Basic Act on Government and Regional Administration) and Peru (through its 1979 Constitution and the Regionalization Act of 1987). Less legally perfected forms of regionalization existed in Colombia since the mid-1980s and in Venezuela, which has a long history of periodic at tempts at regionalization, since 1968.
However, the vagueness surrounding the real meaning of "region" (as noted at the beginning of this article) was making "regionalization" a common word in political and technical language, and the term "region" was used to refer to different territorial realities.
At the moment, a kind of counter-regionalization trend is to be observed in Latin America.2 To cite just the most outstanding examples: i) Venezuela is dismantling the Regional Devel opment Corporations and the national Government is emphasizing decentralization at the State level, at the expense of such action at the regional level.
ii) There is extensive country-wide discussion in Colombia on the real nature of the present regions and possible changes in them in the light of constitu tional principles, while the national Government is apparently giving its backing rather to division into Departments and municipalities.
iii) In Peru, the Government has practically dis mantled the whole regional institutional framework established by the Alan Garcia administration,3 al though Chapter XIV of the draft Constitution voted on 31 October 1993 gives decentralization a second chance by assimilating regions with departments.
iv) The new Sánchez de Lozada administration in Bolivia is also in practice seeking to dissolve the Regional Development Corporations and, as in other countries, is moving towards the formation of Departments and municipal decentralization. v) In Chile, which can be considered the country with the most solidly established regionalization pro cess, the renewed sway of democracy and attempts to secure electoral advantages are bringing to light various regional divisions, tensions and centrifugal forces. The concept of full (political) regionalization never caught on -for obvious reasons-in the most traditionally federal countries, with the exception of Argentina in the 1960s and 1970s.
Thus, it would appear that the established status quo is stronger than the attempts which have been made to transform or reconstruct the current situation in a rational manner, through exogenous and dirigiste procedures. Initial voluntaristic political attempts to organize territory take a very long time to become social and cultural realities, and even taking into ac count the exponential speed at which social time elapses, it does not seem possible to sit back and wait for the consolidation of artificially created regions.4
Perhaps the time has come to recognize that "social engineering" attempts from the "centre down ward" to form regions by adding together and joining political and administrative units have arrived at a dead end. There is strong resistance, and the hindran ces encountered can lead to lost opportunities -for investments, markets, association-at a time when seizing opportunities is the only way to succeed in a competitive world. Competition is not a sÿstem that always allows the strongest to win, but it does permit the systematic triumph of those who know how to seize opportunities, that is to say, the smartest 3 According to comments heard in Peru, this was partially due to excessive interference by the political parties and the over politicization of regional bodies. 4 It should not be forgotten that the Departments of metropolitan France were created by an act of the French Revolution in a man ner which was almost grotesque as far as their boundaries were concerned. Two hundred years later, however, the Department is the cultural reference-point and basis of identity for the people living in it. In Chile, the province -an administrative "artifact" created in 1786-is the immediate territorial reference-point.
Post-modernism5 is an unwelcome guest in at tempts to construct regions on highly artificial initial foundations. So-called post-modern ideas emphasize and value diversity, heterogeneity and fragmentation -sometimes unduly-and thus defend the uniqueness and identity of the original smaller territorial unit (the return to the local level). Post-modernism is also the latest refuge and shield of minorities and therefore is, or can be, a democratic factor, in so far as democracy asserts the value of diversity within unity.
"The problem in Latin America today is how to reconcile substantive rationality with formal ration ality. The question of territorial diversity is of central importance today with the emergence of the new issue of national identities. The world is being glo balized at the economic level, but at the same time identities are shrinking and national expressions are arising. In other words, when people are faced with the uncertainty of being universalized, they seek as surance in returning to the community or local level." This idea expressed by Vega (1991) is extremely ap posite to the present discussion.
Probably one of the most negative characteristics of modernity has been its Faustian megalomania, as Berman (1991) would likely have put it, with its irre sistible attraction to the uniformity and homogenization which cost regional planners of the 1960s so dear.6 II Back to basics: Hilhorst (1980) was right when he wrote that "Although many seem to agree that the concept of region is a mental construct that finds no counterpart in reality, for others it remains an important issue". The "others" are precisely the human persons who live in regions ("human person" might seem like a 5 Post-modernism is the most unexplored ground that can poss ibly be imagined. Modernism, whose date of birth is uncertain, was based on three fundamental ideas: reason, history and pro gress. Freud, Nietzsche and Heidegger were those responsible for giving modernism a far from Christian burial. Post modernism emerged at an uncertain date, but not long ago, when mankind realized that the "modem" project was no longer valid. Post-modernism's stamping-ground is in the street and in intel lectual circles (Lyotard, Baudrillaid, Vattimo) . In this article, the concept of post-modernism is associated basically with one characteristic: fragmentation.
While on the subject of Goethe's tragedy, we should always remember the crime of Philemon and Baucis, as an example of that temptation to homogenize. From that point of view, post-modern ideas are ex tremely attractive. They are, in a certain sense, more humanistic, but one must be wary of new mirages.
"The collapse of the Welfare State and of the great social support networks that characterized it (large enterprises, large trade unions, steady employ ment and collective social security) strengthens local reality as a new territory of solidarity" notes Boisier (1992) in commenting on the essence of regional microcosms, i.e., the relation between human beings and the territory they inhabit.
In a recent book (Drucker, 1992) the words "The Return to Tribalism" are used (somewhat infelicitously) to describe a phenomenon that is a good deal more complex: the demand for a local dimension in a context in which, as already noted, it is necessary to think globally in order to act locally, or in which, once again, the scientific and technological revolution leads to the confusion of global reality with local reality.
It is the danger of the supremacy of the indi vidual and the rise of a sort of territorial anarchism -as a pendular or dialectic response to totalitarian ism and homogenization-which becomes the centre of concern.
what is a region?
tautology, but it is certainly not so in ThomistMaritainist anthropology, where the "personality" of human beings is the attribute which distinguishes their spirituality from their mere material individ uality) and decision and policy makers in the field of regional development.7 Hilhorst does not answer the basic question posed in the title of this section and only suggests further research outside of the neoclassical paradigm.
The Stanford Research Institute (sr i Interna tional, 1990) holds that "The traditional rationale for economic regions and many political boundaries is rapidly giving way to a new economic logic... The concept of regional agglomeration more accurately portrays contemporary economic patterns than do traditional political boundaries... The global economy has become a mosaic of economic regions spanning multiple political jurisdictions. This trend has pro duced and will increasingly require new forms of col laboration among the nations, states, counties and cities involved".
The main point is that the regional rationale is changing, as SRI states. Almost all contextual and structural changes connected with the concept of re gion are due to the dual impact of the scientific and technological revolution and globalization. This makes it necessary to rethink the concept of region, return to the basics, but without the absurd intention of re-establishing obsolete categories.
Three concepts closely linked to the practical de finition of regions, and therefore closely linked to regionalization attempts, have been: distance, spatial friction and contiguity. These three concepts have become obsolescent due to robotization, miniaturiza tion and satellites. The immediate impact was the sharp drop in transport (land, air and sea) and com munications costs. The cost of an intercontinental telephone call now has nothing to do with distance, but rather with the intensity of satellite usage at the moment of the call and with the respective rate struc tures (which are normally part of the "regulated" area of markets). The growing importance of communica tions as a factor of location -as opposed to traditional factors-is giving rise to such terms as communica tions highways and teleports. Indeed, one "bit" of information can give rise to a larger economic oper ation in a region than a whole shipload of traditional goods. Because of this, virtually the whole intellec tual construct of Walter Isard and his collaborators at the University of Pennsylvania, ambitiously en titled "regional science", is stuck in a dead-end street, as Holland (1976) predicted it would be.
In the past, the size of regions was a key crite rion in their definition. A large region8 was presumed to have a better chance of defending itself from cycli cal crises caused by foreign trade and was also pres umed to have greater political power. This latter assumption overlooked the fact that power depends not on size but on inequitable control of scarce re sources, some of which are not even material.
Size, as a criterion for establishing regions, is also becoming obsolescent. Instead of size, what is of interest today is the structural complexity of an or ganized territory.9
Drucker (1992) rightly notes that as money and information have become transnational, even very small units are now economically viable. Large or small, the whole world has equal access to money and information on the same terms. Indeed, the real "unprecedented successes" of the last 30 years have been very small countries. It seems reasonable that "countries" could be replaced by "regions" in all this.
If the organized territory is seen as a systemic structure, its two most important characteristics are precisely its complexity and its final state. Complex ity refers to: i) the variety of internal structures that can be identified in the system;10 ii) the different hierarchical levels through which the feedback and control mechanisms of the system are established, and iii) the non-linear linkages in the system, which generate dissipative structures.11 (In contrast, a typi cal example of linear linkages is that of technical input-output coefficients). Since the organized terri tory is a dynamic system, its final state depends on whether it is a closed or open system. If closed, the final state is one of maximized entropy, whereas in an open system the final state is one of maximized synergy.
From a complementary viewpoint, and return ing to the categories used by Vapfiarsky (1969) , the structural complexity of an organized territory, seen as systemic structure, can be measured through the attributes of interdependence and closedness. Structural complexity is characterized by high interdependence and low closedness.12 A science of complex economies or an economic theory of complexity has yet to be developed, which would serve as a conceptual framework and perhaps provide the tools to work more concretely and operationally on the question of complexity.
Thus, the search today is not aimed at determin ing how "big" a region should be. On the contrary, what is of interest is to determine the smallest or ganized territory that is also highly complex structu rally. For practical reasons, this "downward" search must be limited to the current political and adminis trative divisions (precisely what it was desired to eliminate twenty years ago).
At another level, territorial culture and identity are being revitalized today, not only as intrinsic values but also as factors of regional competitive ness. Organized territories are the new actors in inter national competition for capital, technology and market niches. Such territories -as regions-must project themselves as a unit with a recognized ident ity, as a differentiated whole, capable of offering a corporate image in the best sense of the word. This is possible only if the region can generate a regional project based on a broad social consensus, which is nothing other than an authentic "political project" that generates social mobilization. In many cases, that would be impossible if such a project is not ac companied by and coordinated with a "cultural pro ject" that generates or reinforces a community's identity with its own regional habitat.13
Although many people are loath to use the term "regional marketing", in fact a new and important function in contemporary regional development efforts consists precisely of promoting the region in external markets. A suitable combination of endogenous and exogenous elements, which is the key to successful regional development, partly de pends on the quality of such marketing, while mod em transnational capital considers the territorial environment (collective perception, identification, consensus) as a strategic factor for its location.14 Flexibility, elasticity and ductility aie indispens able requisites for any modem region, in so far as they are factors that facilitate rapid and timely move ment in and out of networks.
Flexibility can be facilitated through rales, in cluding constitutional ones, that allow for territorial association based on the political will of the parties involved. This undoubtedly has a lot to do with the democratic character of regions. The Constitutions of Colombia and Peru may well be noted in this regard. Article 306 of the Colombian Constitution provides that 'Two or more departments may form administra tive and planning regions with their own juridical personality, autonomy and patrimony, the main ob jective being the economic and social development of the respective territory", while article 307 states that "The conditions for requesting the conversion of a region into a territorial entity will be laid down in die respective Basic Act, subject to the views of the Commission on Territorial Organization. The deci sion of Congress will be submitted in each case to a referendum of the citizens of the departments in volved...". Article 190 of the Peruvian Constitution (submitted to a referendum on 31 October 1993) reads: "Regions shall be constituted on the initiative and at the behest of the inhabitants of one or more contiguous departments. Contiguous provinces and districts may also join together or change their form of division...".
The elasticity and ductility of regions refer to their structural conditions that allow them to adapt to their surroundings, either by absorbing outside elements or by adjusting their size to the conditions of the envi ronment. These two characteristics are in contrast to the rigidity of regional structures in the past.
12 Interdependence refers to the proportion of real or effective interactions compared with the theoretical total, while closedness refers to the proportion of interactions which are completed with in the system. 13 For a detailed discussion of regional political and cultural projects, see Boisier, 1992. 14 The importance of regional identity as a factor of regional development in Argentina is stressed in Colantuono (1991) and Palermo (1988) .
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From pivotal, to associative, and thence to virtual regions
Taking into account the characteristics that are of interest today as regional attributes, I suggest giving the title of pivotal regions to the complex, organized territories identifiable within the historical political and administrative divisions. These pivotal regions will be provinces in some countries, departments in others and states in certain federal countries. In all cases they are the smallest political and administra tive units which at the same time are structurally complex, have their own culture and identity, and possess flexibility.15
These pivotal regions (which are somewhat similar to John Friedmann's core regions, but are not necessarily metropolitan) can form larger regions -associative regions-through voluntary union with adjacent territorial units. This is exactly what is pro vided for in the Constitutions of Colombia and Peru. Even though the Constitution of Colombia makes no explicit mention of contiguity, this is implicit in the text of article 4 of Bill No. 184 of 1992, which lays down that administrative and planning regions will be "territorial divisions for the pursuit of national planning functions". In Peru -as already noted-the Constitution explicitly mentions that the departments must be contiguous.
What is the difference between these associative regions and present regions? The difference lies in the fact that in them the partners come together by their own free will, therefore giving the region a democratic character which contrasts with the traditional divisions imposed from above by the central political authorities. In so far as the regions are an expression of free will, they eliminate a number of sources of conflict in the present regions that are hindering them from function ing as constructions really based on historical situations and the mentality of the people.
In some cases, the process of forming regions has entailed extremely high transaction costs. The possibility of forming associative regions would con siderably reduce those costs.
Moreover, pivotal or associative regions can make tactical cooperative arrangements with other regions to form a higher category of regional organ ization: virtual regions. A virtual region is the result of a formal or informal contractual agreement be tween two or more pivotal or associative regions, aimed at achieving certain short-and medium-term objectives. 16 Although this might sound like fantasy, it ac tually takes place. The worst thing that can happen to "regional development specialists" is to be overtaken by the facts yet again: caught in a permanent gulf between their ideas and reality.
With regard to Europe, Curbelo (in the press) notes that: "There are already many examples of re gions and municipalities (usually the larger ones) that enter into cooperative arrangements with other re gions and cities in the Community in order to de velop joint programmes". 17 In Belgium, the objectives of the l e d a (Liège-Europe Development/Action) programme include the strengthening and promotion of international alliances between Liège and other comparable cities, under the slogan: "associate or die".
The concept of the virtual region undoubtedly owes much to the operational procedures developed by the big transnational corporations. The following very recent international press item illustrates the point:
16 Usually in order to introduce a new high-technology product, occupy a market niche, or defend a "space" or "territory" of business and influence. 17 Curbelo cites the example of the so-called "four motors" of Europe (Rhône-Alpes in France, Baden-Württemberg in Germany, Lombardy in Italy, and Catalonia in Spain) which have joined forces to carry out scientific and technological re search programmes.
" IBM, always present in major advances in the world of computers, has launched the first system based on the PowerPC. This, the most powerful microprocessor in the world, is the result of the alliance between three giants of the industry -IB M , Motorola and Apple-and is manufactured by the IBM Electronics Division". This is a perfect example of a "virtual corpora tion": a temporary arrangement to achieve a specific goal (in this case, to compete with INTEL in the com puter chips market). Once the objective is achieved, the association is dissolved. In other words, none of the three original partners lost its corporate identity in all this.
The virtual corporation is a temporary network of independent companies linked by information technology to share skills, costs and access to each other's markets.18 The key attributes of virtual asso ciation are: i) Technology. Informational networks will help far-flung companies and entrepreneurs to link up and work together from start to finish. The partnership will be based on electronic contracts to keep the law yers away and speed the linkups.
ii) Excellence. Because each partner brings its "core competence" to the effort, it may be possible to create a "best-of-everything" organization. Every function and process could be world-class -some thing that no single company could achieve by itself.
iii) Opportunism. Partnerships will be less per manent, less formal, and more opportunistic. Com panies will band together to meet a specific market opportunity and, more often than not, separate once the need evaporates. iv) Trust. These relationships make companies far more reliant on each other and require far more trust than ever before. They will share a sense of "co-destiny", meaning that the fate of each partner is dependent on the other. v) No borders. This new corporate model re defines the traditional boundaries of the company. More cooperation among competitors, suppliers and customers makes it harder to determine where one company ends and another begins.
The concept of relationship-enterprise, similar to the virtual corporation, refers to a network of strategic alliances among big firms, spanning differ ent industries and countries but held together by common goals which encourage them to act almost as a single firm. Such an alliance is driven not just by technological change, but also by the political need to have multiple home bases.
It is not a question, of course, of transforming regions into enterprises, but modem regional devel opment efforts clearly have much to learn from the strategies of large corporations. What is happening in the business world supports the proposal to consider regions as quasi-enterprises, i.e., complex organiza tions with ways of relating to their environment that are similar to the development strategies of large corporations.
The concept of virtual regions adds another, more subjective element which was already men tioned earlier: identity. A strong sense of regional identity is the only guarantee that the virtual associ ation will remain balanced and not become a form of absorption or domination. Identity is the product of a regional culture, understood as a set of values, sym bols and social practices (a cosmogony and an ethos) that unify and separate at one and the same time in order to produce identity -culture and identity based on the valuing of diversity (something very proper to post-modernism), as Cerutti-Gulberg (1991) ex plained so well at a symposium held at the University of Warsaw.
The earliest ideas of "regional virtuality", which are only a few months old, have attracted consider able interest, presumably for two reasons: they make it possible to overcome tensions that seem insuper able in many existing regions constructed from the centre down, and they clearly respond to a growing perception of the dynamics of the globalization pro cess. 19
19 For example, the Bureau of Planning of the department of Antioquia (Colombia) produced an in-house report ("Proposal for the formation of an administrative and planning region in the Occidente region of Colombia") which states: "The Occidente region of Colombia is conceived as a process of strategic allian ces among departments, in order to take advantagç of oppor tunities and take up the challenges presented by new world and national scenarios". The press in Arequipa, Peru and in Concepción and Valdivia in Chile has given this kind of propo sal an enthusiastic reception.
Commenting on the difficulty of distinguishing clear regional structures in Argentina, Grenier (1993) says: "...the highest level is in fact repre sented by the regroupings the provinces are attempt ing to achieve, in this climate of national and international competition promoted by economic neo-liberalism over the last twenty years. Since the average province is too small for such a context and previous regionalization efforts were predicated from a national development perspective, new for mulae open to the exterior are being sought: for example, a "Norte Grande" region encompassing the already traditional Northwest and Northeast regions of Argentina and integrating through the GEICOS project (integration of the Centre-West part of South America) the neighbouring countries of Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay...". This is clearly an attempt to construct virtual regions. Generally speaking, border integration projects -o f which there are many in Latin Americaare also practical examples of the search for virtual arrangements.
IV
Regional deconstruction now?
One of the most complete arguments in favour of the idea of constructing regions in a social and political sense was published by Boisier (1991) as the culmination of a series of studies on ways of combining endogenous and exogenous elements in regional development.
The regions now defined as "pivotal" are by defini tion regions with a high degree of self-construction, espe cially social. They can, however, have flaws in their political and administrative architecture, arising from low levels of political and territorial decentralization.
The social and political construction of regions, as an essentially endogenous process, will continue to be a challenge for most associative regions.20 An explicit common will among all concerned will fa cilitate the design and implementation of a regional political project, without which the region will nor mally remain a mosaic of departments or provinces.
The importance of a common will to create asso ciative regions needs to be emphasized. Poche (1985) commented on "regional aspiration as a social move ment" from a sociological perspective in the follow ing terms: "Such an aspiration transforms regional demands into a social movement, characterized by a situation of unequal development generated by a technical and bureaucratic central State and by its actors, who carry on a social struggle based on the 20 For example, if the departments that comprise the present At lantic Coast region or the present Occidente region of Colombia freely enter into an agreement (or use some other departmental arrangement) to assume the category of an administrative and planning region, their respective "construction" processes must be promoted to the utmost possible extent.
model of class warfare. Since local identity was de stroyed in the process of unequal development, its recovery forms the guiding light of this struggle, whose aim is to reconstitute cultural and economic autonomy on the basis of the reconstructed identity. The political and institutional dimension is finally surpassed in favour of the sociability dimension, which takes its place as the organizing principle of the social structure" (emphasis in the original).
In pivotal regions, political decentralization becomes a sine qua non for constructing from below a kind of "nesting" hierarchy of regions each fitting inside one another. Decentralization makes possible autonomous decision-making, rapid action and ade quate operational resources. From this viewpoint, mere territorial decentralization (like that of Chile today) is not enough, since the formation of associa tive regions requires endogenous political decisions: i.e., decisions taken by regional political bodies di rectly elected by the population.
As associative regions are formed around one (or more than one) pivotal region, size and diversity is increased, but complexity and identity is lost.21 Of course, a kind of marginal cost-benefit analysis could be used to decide on the limits to the enlargement of a region. 21 The province of Concepción in Chile, a pivotal region, loses complexity and its identity becomes less clear as a result of its union with the neighbouring provinces of Ñuble, Arauco and Biobio, so that the collective usefulness of the so-called "Biobio Region" might be questioned. A similar query could be raised with regard to the relationship of the departments of Antioquia or El Valle in Colombia with the Occidente region.
Another complexity that arises in the practical application of these concepts is the possibility that not all units of the current political and administra tive division of a country may join together as asso ciative regions. In this case, there would not be a national regional system but rather the transformation of the national territory into a regional archipelago. If the main aim of national regional systems were to facilitate the regional disaggregation of national plans and to establish a national regional develop ment policy, however (two questions that are com pletely alien to the current economic paradigm), then the formation of such an archipelago would be basi cally unimportant.
What political and administrative structures are required to make a virtual region operational? Since the virtual agreement is only temporary, there can be no question of creating stable, permanent bodies. This means that coordination, rather than unified management, must be the basic element in cooper ation. Coordination, in turn, depends on communica tion, for the fact that present technology allows for real-time "face to face" communication facilitates virtual arrangements. Once again, the transaction costs may be high and, as Alexander (1992) points out, planning is needed in such cases as part of the response to high market transaction costs. Planning is associated, in particular, with the establishment of hierarchies ranging from simple unitary organizations to complex frameworks and inter-organizational sys tems, as virtual regions would be. When diffuse rela tions based on trust are developed -face to face relations, according to Berger and Luckmann (1980) transaction costs are lowered, allowing for flexible specialization, as Rojas (1993) notes in a recent pre liminary study on the weakness of the social actors in the Biobio region of Chile.
Civil society and political society have different roles to play in the regions in the formation of asso ciative and virtual relationships. The political actors are the leading elements in associative relationships, while the civil actors (entrepreneurs, etc.) are more important for virtual relationships.
The "nesting" hierarchy of pivotal, associative and virtual regions fitting inside one another clearly corresponds to a constructivist rather than a positivist view of reality, at least as regards its multiplicity and heterogeneity. It must also be kept in mind that the observer/operator must be part of that perception of reality, since this is the only definitive way to stop constructions from the top down or from the centre outwards. According to Edgar Morin, there can be no subject without a relationship to an outside environ ment which allows that subject to recognize, think, and hence exist; in this way, complexity is reflected better, avoiding analytical-Cartesian reductionism which "while seeking regularity, reduced the com plex to the simple", in the words of Montero (1993) .
Ultimately, self-determination and flexibility would appear to be the two major pillars of this type of "nesting" hierarchy of pivotal, associative and vir tual regions. The resulting panorama can only be conceived of in dynamic and not static terms. The best metaphor for this panorama would be a slowmotion film of a fountain, showing the multiplicity of simultaneous structures that take shape and disap pear, or a similar slow-motion film of a volcano erupting. Self-determination is a psychosocial and political matter, while flexibility is a technical and administrative issue.
Virtual arrangements also have the quality of being multiple: that is to say, a single pivotal or asso ciative region can simultaneously maintain various virtual links, each of them formed on an ad hoc basis.
Why a "new" form of regionalism at this time? The answer is that globalization and the emergence of supranational groups like the European Com munity have produced a backlash: the desire of indi viduals to belong to a smaller community. At the same time, new technologies are turning Schu macher's dream that small is beautiful into reality, and today the region is seen as the optimal unit for managing economic development, while the nation state is being questioned in every way: for being too small to cope with global issues or too large to deal with local matters. Table 1 below summarizes the main charac teristics of the three kinds of regions.
Is all this a "light" proposal for regionaliza tion, that is to say, typically post-modern in its lightness? In no way.
The post-modernism of the proposal lies in the overcoming of the typically "modem" temptation to homogenize and in the introduction of a considerable degree of flexibility: a characteristic more typical of "post-Fordism" than "post-modernism" and, in any case, an inescapable requisite of the present times. "The idea is now taking hold that society is a set of uncontrollable and ever-changing flows, in the midst of which the actors work out individual strategies and hang on to fragmentary cultural identities. This is post-modern culture..." (Montero, 1993) .
Independently of personal preferences, modem meta-stories have lost part of their validity and so ciety seems to be regressing to certain fundamentalisms that were once thought to belong to the past, some negative and others not: nationalism, racism, regional sentiment, new mysticisms, and even the re turn of wizards.
(Original: Spanish) "These categories correspond to those used by Linstone (1987) : technical perspective (T), organizational perspective (O) and personal perspective (P).
